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INTRODUCTION: 
The current landscape of professional basketball has changed considerably over the last 
fifteen years, and nothing has been more contentious than the NBA’s drafting rules.  In fact, 
during the negotiations for the 2017-2024 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), the 
age restriction rule was a major discussion point for the two bargaining units.1  Age eligibility 
restrictions have been topics collectively bargained for since 2005, where, until then, athletes 
only needed a high school diploma to play in the NBA.2  This new rule which increased the draft 
eligibility floor to the age of nineteen, colloquially regarded as the “one-and-done” rule, has been 
the center of debate amongst sports analysts and academics since it was enacted.3  Prior to 2005, 
the NBA had begun to see an influx of high school players forego college, favoring instead an 
immediate transition to professional basketball.  Players such as LeBron James, Kobe Bryant, 
Kevin Garnett, and Dwight Howard quickly became household names with their instant success.4 
Players like Kwame Brown, Sebastian Telfair, and Robert Swift, on the other hand, 
proved to be unproductive and had short-lived careers.5  These draft “busts” were the athletes the 
NBA had in mind when it implemented Title X of the 2005 CBA, which required: 
 
1
 Sam C. Ehrlich, Clarrett’s Shadow: How a 14-Year-Old Case Will Impact NBA Age Rule Bargaining, 19 TEX. 
REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 29, 31 (2009).  
2
 Warren K. Zola, Transitioning to the NBA: Advocating on Behalf of Student-Athletes for NBA & NCAA Rule 
Changes, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 159, 171 (2011); Jack N.E. Pitts, Jr., Comment, Why Wait?: An Antitrust 
Analysis of the National Football League and National Basketball Association’s Draft Eligibility Rules, 51 HOWARD 
L.J. 433, 435 (2008); Nitin Sharma, Current Issues in Public Policy: An Antitrust and Public Policy Analysis of the 
NBA’s Age/Education Policy: At Least One Road Leads to Rome, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 483 (2010) 
(discussing how the previous version of the NBA’s CBA, which was implemented in 1999 “contained minimal 
restrictions on the eligibility of high school athletes for the NBA Draft” because “[i]n the 1999 version, the only 
restraint on eligibility was contained within Article X(5)(a), which granted eligibility ‘to those amateur players who 
have either graduated from high school or who have received the equivalence of a high school diploma’”).  
3
 See generally Brian Lovell, Note, Eighteen Years Old and Ready for Driving, Cigarettes and War, but not 
Basketball: Why the NBA is Committing a Foul on the Age Eligibility Rule, 26 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 415 (2012); 
Uriah Tagle, Delay of Game: Analyzing the Legality of the NBA and WNBA Eligibility Rules and Their Effects on 
Top Amateur Basketball Players, 21 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 159 (2018); Benjamin S. Weisfelner, Reverse 
Slam Dunk: Making the Case That the National Basketball Association’s Minimum Age Requirement Violates State 
Discrimination Laws, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 203 (2011). 
4
 See generally Angel Rodriguez, Lebron James’ Career Timeline, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 1, 2018, 8:10 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/sports/nba/la-sp-lakers-lebron-timeline-20180701-story.html (giving a brief overview of 
LeBron James’ success beginning in the 2003 NBA Draft until his signing with the Lakers in 2018); J.M. Poulard, Is 
Kobe Bryant the Most Successful Player of His Era?, BLEACHER REPORT (May 10, 2014), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2058485-is-kobe-bryant-the-most-successful-player-of-his-era (discussing the 
accolades of Kobe Bryant, which include a league MVP, five NBA Championships, and two NBA Finals MVPs); 
Cork Gaines, How Kevin Garnett Made $326 Million to Become the Highest-Paid Player in NBA History, Business 
Insider (Sept. 24, 2016, 2:21 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/kevin-garnett-career-earnings-minnesota-
timberwolves-2016-9 (discussing the success of Kevin Garnett, which not only netted him $326 million dollars over 
the length of his career, but also rendered him a fifteen time all-star, and an NBA Champion); Ross Coleman, 
Dwight Howard: Where Does He Rank Among the Best Centers in NBA History?, BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 7, 
2011), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/600663-dwight-howard-where-does-he-rank-among-the-best-centers-in-
nba-history (ranking Dwight Howards as the ninth best Center in NBA history after his seventh season in the NBA).   
5
 See generally Mark Brown, Kwame Brown: The Biggest Bust Ever?, BLEACHER REPORT (Jul. 17, 2009), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/219636-kwame-brown-the-biggest-bust-ever (after being drafted first overall in 
2002, a year before LeBron James was taken first overall out of high school, this article gives a brief overview of the 
downward spiral that was Kwame Brown’s career); Craig Meyer, The Curious Case of Sebastian Telfair: From NYC 
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[T]he player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar year in 
which the Draft is held, and (B) with respect to a player who is not an 
international player … at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since the player’s 
graduation from high school (or, if the player did not graduate from high school, 
since the graduation of the class with which the player would have graduated had 
he graduated from high school).6 
 The language of this provision is still in effect today in what is now Article X of the 
2017-2024 CBA.7  However, the age eligibility restrictions cannot be effectively understood 
without an understanding of their legal development and their impact on the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (“NCAA”).  The NBA’s implementation of Title X in the 2005 CBA came 
in the immediate aftermath of the Clarrett decision, which was decided in 2004.8  The decision 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the NFL’s age/education policy because it found 
the policy to be shielded from antitrust scrutiny by the non-statutory labor exemption.  With this 
decision, all professional sports leagues were put on notice to collectively bargain for eligibility 
rules in order to shield themselves from antitrust law. 
In the wake of the 2005 CBA, highly touted high school basketball prospects dealt with these 
new eligibility guidelines by attending universities with prestigious basketball programs for the 
minimum requirement of one year before entering the NBA Draft.9  Highly ranked high school 
players attending college for one year before declaring for the NBA Draft has also impacted how 
the Draft has actually played out in recent years.  As noted by one commentator, “the trend in 
recent years has been to use those top [draft] selections to take the best young players; a lottery 
pick has not been used on a non-freshman since Victor Oladipo and Otto Porter were selected 
second and third overall respectively in 2013.”10  As a result of the NBA’s new age restrictions, 
the NCAA, which governs intercollegiate athletics and defines the rules under which college 
basketball programs can operate, became heavily reliant on the policy as its primary mechanism 
 
Phenom to NBA Bust, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 5, 2009), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/230844-the-curious-
case-of-sebastian-telfair-from-nyc-phenom-to-nba-bust (discussing how after being selected with the thirteen overall 
pick in the 2004 NBA Draft, he went on to play on four teams by the sixth year of his career because of his 
lackluster on-court performance); Mike Thomas, The Sad Story of NBA Bust Robert Swift, SPORTSCASTING (Jun. 15, 
2020), https://www.sportscasting.com/the-sad-story-of-nba-bust-robert-swift/ (discussing how Swift’s NBA career 
took a turn for the worse after being selected with the twelfth overall pick in the 2004 NBA Draft). 
6
 Pitts, Jr., supra note 2, at 435.   
7
 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Basketball Association and National Basketball Players 
Ass’n, art. X, https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-
Bargaining-Agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter NBA CBA]. 
8
 Clarett v. National Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
9
 Sharma, supra note 2, at 482.  But see, Chris Broussard, Exchange Student, ESPN (NOV. 20, 2008), 
https://www.espn.com/espnmag/story?section=magazine&id=3715746 (discussing how Brandon Jennings, one of 
the nation’s top high school point guards, opted to play in Italy over the NCAA for a year before entering the NBA 
Draft); see also Andrew Joseph, LaVar Ball Announces That LaMelo Will ‘Definitely’ Play Overseas in Australia or 
China, USA TODAY SPORTS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2019/04/lavar-lamelo-ball-college-overseas-
australia-china-pro-basketball (discussing how one of the top high school recruits in the country is opting to play 
professional basketball overseas rather than play in the NCAA).  
10
 Zach Leach, Dump and Chase: Why the NFL, NBA, and MLB Should Abandon Their Problematic Amateur Draft 
Age Limits and Rookie Wage Structures and Adopt the Current NHL Model, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 177, 200 
(2018). 
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for revenue.  For example, it is estimated that the NCAA’s annual basketball tournament, 
“March Madness,” generates more than $800 million for the organization.11 
Ultimately, the one-and-done rule left high school players with two options: either sit out a 
year after high school before entering the draft or spend at least one year playing, either college 
basketball or in an international professional league while awaiting draft eligibility.12  This 
eligibility rule had the effect of furthering the NBA’s “de facto minor-league system,” in which 
players develop skills without being compensated by any professional organization, per the 
NCAA’s amateurism policies.13  Requiring student-athletes to play elsewhere for a year before 
they are eligible for generous compensation by the NBA or, for those players not entering the 
NBA, not allowing students to profit off their own image, when coupled with the extraordinary 
amount of money student-athletes generate for the NCAA and their respective university, did not 
come without criticism.14  Such criticism was primarily premised on the paternalistic and 
economic considerations of the rule, where critics argue that such a rule only exists to promote 
“the economic interests of colleges and universities, as premier high school seniors who would 
otherwise jump to the NBA are now likely to play college basketball for at least one season.”15  
For the students who will never play at the professional level, or worse, for those players who 
would have entered the NBA barring injury, playing collegiate basketball may be the best 
opportunity to develop and monetize their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”).  This issue is only 
further complicated by the racial and economic dimensions of collegiate players, in which this 
rule disproportionately impacts minority student-athletes.16   
In this spirit, this paper analyzes the development of the NBA’s age restriction rules.  Beyond 
simply analyzing the legal history of the one-and-done rule, this paper will place the NBA’s draft 
requirements in conjunction with (1) the legislative developments of NIL compensation in states 
like Florida, California, and Colorado, and (2) legislative developments at the federal level 
because the NCAA went so far as to propose new uniform legislation to Congress in the summer 
of 2020.17  In the wake of the new legislation surrounding NCAA players’ ability to profit off 
 
11
 Darren Geeter, March Madness Makes Enough Money to Nearly Fund the Entire NCAA – Here’s How, CNBC 
(Mar. 22, 2:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/22/ncca-march-madness-tournament-basketball.html 
(discussing how “March Madness” brings in more than 75% of the NCAA’s yearly revenue). 
12
 Ehrlich, supra note 1, at 29.  
13
 Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 731, 733-34 (2006). 
14
 See generally Steve E. Cavezza, Can I See Some ID: An Antitrust Analysis of NBA and NFL Draft Eligibility 
Rules, 9 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 22, 37 (2010) (arguing that college freshmen who are drafted high in their 
respective draft would have been drafted near the same position the year prior had the age rule not barred them from 
eligibility).  Cavezza argued that “[w]hile [student-athletes’] draft ‘stocks’ may not have dropped due to the one year 
they spent in college, they [were] still harmed.  They were not able to earn a paycheck for that year, and their 
professional careers have been shortened by a year.” 
15
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 733.  
16
 See Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure, 6 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 199, 199 (1996) (discussing that the NCAA amateurism “rules impos[e] financial restrictions [that] fail 
to comport with the economic and social realities that confront many student-athletes, particularly African-
Americans”). 
17
 Dan Murphy, Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill Introduced for College Sports, ESPN (Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29961059/bipartisan-federal-nil-bill-introduced-college-sports 
(discussing how the NCAA asked Congress to enact a federal law in order to avoid differences in state law with 
regard to NCAA NIL rules); see also Ross Dellenger, NCAA Presents Congress With Bold Proposal for NIL 
85 
their NIL, and the NBA’s developing G League, collegiate basketball players may, for the first 
time, have a real opportunity to profit off their NIL in an equitable manner.  However, if the 
NBA and NCAA cannot continue to change and adopt new, forward-thinking age restriction 
rules, the trend appears to indicate that student-athletes will find other avenues to monetize their 
brand.   
Part I of this paper gives a brief antitrust analysis as those laws relate to age eligibility rules 
in the NBA.  Part II of this paper reviews the evolution of professional sports age eligibility 
requirements as they relate to their respective drafts.  Part III will discuss the current format of 
the NBA’s Draft, its rookie wage scale, and the G League by assessing the proliferation of talent 
to different leagues outside the NCAA.  Additionally, this section will analyze the new NIL 
legislation and discuss how that impacts the NCAA, and, by proxy, the NBA G League.  Part IV 
will compare the eligibility rules and minor league structures in the MLB, NHL, and Europe.  As 
this paper will show, the NBA should abandon their current age restrictions and rookie wage 
structures and use the G League to mimic the model set forth in the NHL or in Europe. 
 
I. ANTITRUST LAW AND AGE ELIGIBILITY RULES IN THE NBA 
 
Antitrust law and labor law have long battled for a position between the promotion of 
competition and the protection of labor principles.18  Where antitrust law seeks to prevent 
restraints of trade through the enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act), federal 
labor law promotes the unionization of workers through the National Labor Relations Board, 
which consists of a process that potentially produces anticompetitive effects.19  The Sherman Act 
has provided the mechanism by which parties can challenge the age eligibility restrictions.20  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, 
supplies the primary source of litigation on these issues.21  There are three requirements for a 
viable Section 1 claim: (1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) the contract, combination, 
or conspiracy produces a restraint of trade; and (3) the restraint affected trade or commerce 
 
Legislation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jul. 31, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/07/31/ncaa-sends-congress-nil-
legislation-proposal. 
18
 Pitts, Jr., supra note 2, at 438 (emphasizing that “this tension results from the seemingly contradictory goals of 
the two different areas of law”).  
19
 Id. at 438. 
20
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 734; James Landry & Thomas A. Baker III., Change Or Be Changed: A 
Proposal for the NCAA to Combat Corruption and Unfairness by Proactively Reforming its Regulation of the 
Athlete Publicity Rights, 9 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 16 (2019) (discussing how “the Sherman Antitrust 
Act has provided the foothold for plaintiffs challenging the NCAA's amateurism restrictions on the basis that they 
impose unreasonable restraints on trade”).  See also Michael A. McCann, The NBA and the Single Entity Defense: A 
Better Case, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 39, 45 (2010) (discussing how the NBA, “by collectively bargaining rules 
with the NBPA, [] ensures that [its] rules are exempt from section 1 of the Sherman Act”) [hereinafter Single Entity 
Defense].  
21
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 734. 
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among the several states.22  It is also important to note that in sports settings, restraints of trade 
are concerned with the labor market rather than a product market.23   
Alleged violations of Section 1 are scrutinized by one of three legal standards.  First is the 
“rule of reason” standard, in which “a restraint will only be upheld if it results in a net 
procompetitive effect and the benefits of that effect could not have been achieved by 
substantially less restrictive alternatives.”24  Second is the “per se” analysis, in which the 
defendant’s practices are presumed unreasonable, thereby relieving the plaintiff of having to 
demonstrate anticompetitive effects, with illegality automatically following regardless of the pro-
competitive effects or motives.25  And finally, there is a hybrid form of scrutiny that has been 
developed by the courts—the “quick look” rule of reason, which “mediates between” the rule of 
reason and per se analysis.26  It maintains the per se analysis’s presumption of unreasonable 
practices while also considering any potential anticompetitive effects, market power, and 
efficiencies in order to better understand a restraint’s potential competitive impact.27 
Some commentators have regarded the quick look analysis as particularly useful in sports 
antitrust disputes context, because it has the potential to oscillate between the interests of the 
leagues and its players.28  In applying the quick look analysis, courts may avoid mechanically 
rejecting a league regulation or restriction, while still having the ability to examine that 
regulation or restriction’s anticompetitive effects with a heightened scrutiny.29  Though courts 
apply the per se analysis to most alleged violations of Section 1, courts, at least in the sports 
context, prefer to require plaintiffs to satisfy the rule of reason standard because of “the unique 
nature of sports leagues.”30 
In an effort to mitigate the tension between labor and antitrust law, Congress developed the 
statutory exemption and the courts developed the non-statutory exemption.31  The statutory 
exemption came about as the result of the Congressional desire to empower unions in situations 
where workers were viewed as unequal to management; because of this, Congress went on to 
 
22
 Id. at 734.  See also Ariel Y. Bublick, Are You Ready for Some Football: How Antitrust Laws Can Be Used to 
Break Up DirecTV’s Exclusive Right to Telecast NFL’s Sunday Ticket Package, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 223, 225-26 
(2011) (discussing the “Rule of Reason” analysis in Standard Oil). 
23
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 734.  See also PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 
277 (3rd ed. 2004) (briefly introducing the concept of the “players’ market”).  
24
 Joseph Citelli, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and the Rule of Reason, 3 ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 56, 70-
71 (2014).  
25
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 735.  See also Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Law and Economics 
of Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 347 (2002) (discussing how 
the “per se analysis relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving anticompetitive effects, which are presumed”) 
[hereinafter Illegal Defenses]. 
26
 Max Shulman, The Quick Look Rule of Reason: Retreat From Binary Antitrust Analysis, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 89, 
89 (2001).  
27
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at. 735.  See also Max Shulman, supra note 26, at 91-92 (emphasizing the 
inadequacies of the “per se” and the rule of reason analysis on their own in the sports context).   
28
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 735.  But see Max Shulman, supra note 26, at 91-92 (discussing how “for 
those horizontal restraints that have a substantial, direct adverse economic impact, the result under quick look has 
generally been no different from what it would have been had the per se rule been applied”).   
29
 McCann & Rosen, supra note 13, at 735-736.  
30
 Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis, 34 GA. L. REV. 137, 148 (1999).  
31
 Pitts, Jr., supra note 2, at 439.  
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enact the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to provide unions with certain 
protections.32  These sections, which protected unions from federal court intervention, allowed 
those same unions to preclude negotiations between a single employee and an employer.33  The 
statutory exemption, which is the result of those two legislative acts, did not protect all the issues 
that can present themselves with regard to eligibility restrictions.34  “In an effort to close the gaps 
and expand the protection of the statutory exemption to union activity, the non-statutory 
exemption emerged in the courts.”35  Effectively, the non-statutory labor exemption went beyond 
the scope of the enumerated exceptions laid out in the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act.36  This non-statutory labor exemption was ultimately used as a defensive mechanism to 
protect collectively bargained for terms from any form of antitrust scrutiny.37  However, in 
effect, the mechanisms created to protect players’ rights (the idea of collectively bargained for 
terms) also gave the respective leagues a roadmap to negotiate terms that would blatantly violate 
antitrust law, but still withstand judicial scrutiny.38  Because the non-statutory labor exemption 
allowed draft eligibility requirements to be collectively bargained for by both the NBA and 
NBPA, they cannot violate the Sherman Act.39 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AGE ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
In 1922, in an incredibly impactful case, the Supreme Court concluded that baseball was 
exempt from antitrust law altogether.40  This holding served “to protect [baseball] from many 
challenges and allowed for labor control that may be considered unconscionable” by present-day 
standards.41  Nevertheless, basketball, or any other professional sport for that matter, did not 
enjoy the same antitrust protections.42  Even then, though, “courts have acknowledged the 
functional and economic uniqueness of industries wherein competitors share revenue and prefer 
a higher level of competition.”43  Thirty-five years later, the NFL, in Radovich v. National 
 
32
 Id. at 439 (discussing how “the statutory exemption’s protection is limited to certain unilateral conduct of labor 
unions”); Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Law and Economics of Banning High School Players from the 
NBA Draft, 1 VA. Sports & ENT. L.J. 295, 341 (2002).  
33
 Illegal Defense, supra note 25, at 341. 
34
 Darren W. Dummit, Upon Further Review: Why the NFL May Not be Free After Clarett, and Why Professional 
Sports May be Free from Antitrust Law, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 149, 154 (2005).  
35
 Pitts, Jr., supra note 2, at 440.  
36
 Abraham Spira, Almost Three Decades Later, Is Mackey Still Viable?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805, 813 (2007). 
37
 Leach, supra note 10, at 185.   
38
 Id. at 185.  
39
 Id.  
40
 See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  
41
 Leach, supra note 10, at 184.  
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. at 185.  
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Football League, confirmed for every professional sports organization that they did not enjoy the 
same antitrust exemption as baseball and the MLB.44 
 Nearly fifty years after Federal Baseball, in 1971, Spencer Haywood challenged the 
NBA Draft rules, which had not yet become a collective bargaining subject between the NBA 
and the NBPA.45  In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Spencer Haywood brought an 
antitrust lawsuit, in which he argued that the NBA unilaterally imposed age restrictions that, in 
effect, barred him from playing in the NBA; Haywood sought an injunction prohibiting the 
application of the eligibility rules because they were in violation of the Sherman Act.46  In 
response, the NBA argued that the age restriction rules “constituted a valid self-regulatory 
scheme.”47  The court, however, was quick to point out that the NBA’s “scheme” was overly 
broad and arbitrary, and they determined that the eligibility rules constituted a group boycott, 
which was per se illegal.48  Therefore, the rule of reason analysis was inapplicable.49  Haywood 
prevailed on his claim and was allowed to play in the NBA.  The post-Denver Rockets NBA 
went on to alter their eligibility rules.  They went on to allow players who could demonstrate 
“financial hardship” enter the NBA, and eventually, the NBA simply settled on allowing all high 
school graduates to enter the draft straight out of high school.50 
 In 1976, the NFL experienced first-hand the true power of the non-statutory labor 
exemption.  In Mackey v. National Football League, a group of veteran NFL players challenged 
a rule that had previously been unilaterally enforced by the league.51  The court, when analyzing 
the facts of the case – which consisted of, most importantly, a rule that could have been 
collectively bargained but was not – laid the foundation for new antitrust review.52  The crux of 
Mackey was that the court developed a three-prong test to determine if a particular term must be 
collectively bargained or, if not, if said term is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of 
antitrust law.53  The test proceeds as follows:  
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-
eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects 
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.  Second, federal labor 
policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be 
exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.  Finally, the 
policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to 
override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the 
product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.54 
 
44
 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Leach, supra note 10, at 187.  
45
 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
46
 Id.; Leach, supra note 10, at 187-88; Tagle, supra note 3, at 171. 
47
 Leach, supra note 10, at 188.  
48
 Leach, supra note 10, at 188; Tagle, supra note 4, at 172. 
49
 Tagle, supra note 3, at 172. 
50
 Leach, supra note 10, at 188; Tagle, supra note 3, at 172. 
51
 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
52
 Leach, supra note 10, at 189.  
53
 Abraham Spira, supra note 36, at 817. 
54
 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.  
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While Mackey court ultimately held that a Sherman Act violation had taken place, it also gave all 
professional sports leagues “a step-by-step process to create [ ] valid, collectively bargained rules 
that could restrict the player market while withstanding antitrust challenge[s].”55 
Seven years after the Denver Rockets case and two years after Mackey, James Smith 
attacked the structure of the NFL Draft.56  Smith, a twelfth-round selection, was injured after 
playing one year in the NFL.57  Smith sued the NFL for the difference between what he would 
have been able to earn had he had the opportunity to negotiate with every team in the league 
compared to what actually happen – his being limited to only negotiating with the one team that 
drafted him.58  However, “[f]orgotten by football history is the fact that Smith actually won the 
case” and the court concluded that “the NFL draft was not exempt under the nonstatutory labor 
exemption.”59  The court held that “[t]he draft inescapably forces each seller of football services 
to deal with one, and only one buyer, robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic market, of any 
real bargaining power.”60  Smith went on to win treble damages in the sum of the estimated 
difference between his actual and fair-market salary for a player of his caliber.61  Ultimately, 
post-Smith, the NFL Draft would be brought into collective bargaining negotiations; this would 
have the effect of shielding the Draft via the labor exemption.62 
 In 1977, in Linseman v. World Hockey Association, a federal district court reaffirmed the 
holding in Denver Rockets when it held that a league-imposed rule requiring that players be 
twenty-years-old constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.63  The court in Linseman 
emphasized that teams cannot, as a matter of law, conspire to boycott all players under a 
particular age.64   
Then, in 1986, in what would turn out to be a significant legal development, courts began 
to address the relationship between a professional sports union’s duty of fair representation and 
draft age requirements.65  Zimmerman v. NFL was a “case [that] concerned the 1984 
supplemental draft and its effect on a player drafted out of the USFL and the draft’s alleged 
violation of the Sherman Act because it allowed the drafted player to negotiate with only one 
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NFL team.”66  The most important element of Zimmerman’s argument was that he was not 
subject to the NFL’s CBA because as a player in the USFL, he was not a party to the collective 
bargaining relationship, and that the NFLPA “failed to consult with any USFL players before 
approving the supplemental draft.”67  The court used the Mackey test to analyze this claim.  Yet, 
the district court noted that the Mackey test did not apply to agreements that affect competitors or 
actors entirely removed from the bargaining relationship.68  Even then, “the court decided that 
Zimmerman, and the rest of the USFL players, ‘[did] not fall into this protected group’ because 
both present and ‘potential future players’ are parties to the bargained relationship.”69  The court 
in Zimmerman established that potential future players are members of the bargaining unit and 
bound by the CBAs made between their potential future union representatives, before actually 
being represented by the bargaining unit, and the professional sports league.70 
 The next case that directly impacted the rights of potential future players was Wood v. 
NBA, where Leon Wood challenged the NBA’s draft as a violation of the Sherman Act.71  Wood 
argued both that the NBA Draft constituted an agreement among horizontal competitors in order 
to eliminate competition and that the CBA provisions were illegal because they directly impacted 
potential employees outside of the bargaining unit.72  The court went on to reaffirm the holdings 
in Zimmerman that great freedom is given to professional sports unions to bargain with 
employers over terms that affect current and future players.73  However, critics have argued that 
this exception to antitrust law is rather problematic because potential future players are held to 
the terms of a CBA without having a true seat at the table; while those players in their respective 
leagues are represented by their players’ unions, those at the college level must abide by the 
collectively bargained restrictions, even though they do not yet have a voice.74 
 Most recently, there has been Clarett v. NFL.75  While there were other cases that touched 
on similar issues and brought attention to the issues of players unions and draft age restrictions, 
none were more impactful than Clarett.  Maurice Clarett was a freshman running back at the 
Ohio State University in 2002, where he led the team to an undefeated record and a national 
championship.76  Immediately after his freshman season, which included 1,237 rushing yards and 
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18 touchdowns, Clarett began to have eligibility problems with the NCAA. 77  Clarett was 
eventually suspended by the Ohio State University in order to insulate the institution from an 
NCAA sanction because he had received improper benefits; because of this, he sought to enter 
the 2003 NFL Draft.   
When he was barred from doing so, Clarett brought an action against the NFL, where he 
argued that the NFL rule prohibiting players from entering the draft until they had been out of 
high school for three years violated antitrust law.78  The district court found for Clarett, but the 
NFL quickly appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  In Clarett II, the court held that: 
[T]he labor market for NFL players is organized around a collective bargaining 
relationship that is provided for and promoted by federal labor law, and that the 
NFL clubs, as a multi-employer bargaining unit, can act jointly in setting the 
terms and conditions of players’ employment and the rules of the sport without 
risking antitrust liability.  For those reasons, the NFL argues that federal labor law 
favoring and governing the collective bargaining process precludes the 
application of the antitrust laws to its eligibility rules.  We agree.79 
In this capacity, Clarett II “appeared to mirror the rationale from Wood” in the sense that future 
players were obligated to abide by collectively bargained for terms even though they had no say 
in the collective bargaining process.80   
The court focused on the fact that the terms and conditions of Clarett’s, or any other 
potential future players’, employment were negotiated by the NFLPA.81  The Second Circuit 
reasoned that because this age eligibility rule was to deal with initial employment, the rule was a 
subject of mandatory bargaining.82  The Second Circuit concentrated on the right of the NFLPA 
“to advantage certain categories of players over others.”83  “The NFLPA’s power allows it ‘to 
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents,’ and the union can, ‘for example, favor 
veteran players over rookies … and … seek to preserve jobs for current players to the detriment 
of new employees and the exclusion of outsiders.”84  The Second Circuit reaffirmed that unions, 
premised on the duty of fair representation, can favor certain groups of members over others.85   
Clarett II’s biggest contribution was that it rejected the three-prong Mackey test and 
provided a new framework for the non-statutory exemption that allowed professional 
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organizations to avoid antitrust scrutiny in situations involving eligibility rules.86  Ultimately, the 
Clarett II decision expanded the non-statutory labor exemption when it included eligibility rules 
as subject of mandatory bargaining.87  In essence, Clarett II put all professional sports unions on 
notice that if they did not like a particular bargaining topic, they should renegotiate the term 
under their respective CBAs rather than seek protection under federal antitrust law.88  The NFL’s 
victory in Clarett II also proved to be quite the win for the NCAA because the NFL’s age 
restriction, which forced the hands of student-athletes and required them to play in the NCAA 
before they could enter NFL Draft, was left intact.89 
The 2005 NBA CBA clearly took notice of the Second Circuit’s decision in Clarett II 
when it collectively bargained for the “one-and-done rule,” which raised the age draft floor from 
eighteen to at least nineteen years of age, effective starting in the 2006 NBA Draft.90  This was 
the first time the NBA worked to limit the entry of players into the NBA Draft since Haywood.  
This rule increasing the draft eligibility age to nineteen was the product of collective bargaining, 
and, therefore, skirted around antitrust scrutiny.  Altogether, between 1995 and 2004, only thirty-
six players had come straight out of high school and were selected in the NBA Draft.91  
However, upon notice of an impending age restriction, an additional eleven players declared for 
the 2005 NBA Draft straight out of high school.92  Upon being drafted, there is little flexibility 
for incoming-rookies when it comes to negotiating their first contract.  All draft picks, per the 
2005 CBA, were first offered a “Required Tender” of a minimum-value contract determined by 
the league that served to lock in exclusive negotiating rights of the player.93  Additionally, “[a]ll 
first-round picks [were] required to sign a two-year contract with team options for the third and 
fourth years.”94  The NBA also provided both the “Rookie Salary Scale” value and required base 
salary scale value, so teams and first-round selections knew immediately what their salary 
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III. CURRENT FORMAT OF THE NBA’S DRAFT, ROOKIE WAGE SCALE, AND 
THE G LEAGUE 
 
 While it is readily apparent the impact the Clarett II decision had on the 2005 NBA-
NBPA CBA, that decision also served to further complicate the relationship of the NCAA and 
the NBA.  When the 2005 CBA increased the age floor of the NBA Draft, the interests of the 
NCAA and the NBA became undeniably aligned.  “[T]he age rule creates a ‘symbiotic 
relationship between the NBA and NCAA’ as it induces ‘the best 17- and 18-year-olds to make 
the one-year rental agreement with college basketball’ thus ‘uplifting college basketball’s 
national viability.’”96  Given the exuberant NBA contracts that are more common in today’s 
NBA, is also easy to infer why the NBA would prefer a higher age rule.  If a player’s rookie 
contract, which is limited in its negotiating power, subject to collective bargaining, and capped at 
below-market rates, covers the first couple of years of their career, as it does for first round picks 
under the current CBA, it would then be in the best interest of an NBA organization to ensure 
that those first four years cover as much of that player’s prime career output as possible.97  
Ultimately, this would ensure that a player’s best potential earning seasons are covered under the 
NBA’s rookie salary scale, which has the effect of limiting a player’s compensation significantly 
below that player’s open-market value; this is because the NBA organization that drafted the 
player would avoid having to compete for that player on the open market entirely.98  Instead, that 
player would be locked-in to a rookie deal that caps his salary, even though his on-court 
performance may demand a significantly higher salary.   
However, the NBA’s current CBA is notably different than its previous versions in some 
important capacities – primarily with regard to its expansion and development of the NBA G 
League.  The 2017 CBA between the NBA and the NBPA introduced a new concept to the NBA 
Standard Player Contract: two-way contracts.99  Two-way contracts give players a prorated lower 
salary for each day they play in the G League.100  But with the expansion of the G League and 
the introduction of two-way contracts, the NCAA and the NBA suddenly find themselves with 
contrasting financial and developmental interests when it comes to the development of top high-
school basketball prospects.101   
From an empirical perspective, the dynamics of the NBA’s draft process has changed 
since the implementation of the “one-and-done” rule, as the NBA has seen a decrease in the 
number of seasoned student-athletes selected in the draft, and an increase in younger, first- or 
second-year student-athletes being drafted.102  This is in no small part due to this age requirement 
rule.  Essentially, the NBA’s one-and-done rule forces the hand of every high-school basketball 
player in the country into attending an NCAA university for at least one year.103  While there, the 
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expectation is that student-athletes abide by the NCAA’s amateurism policies and rules.  But it is 
“the combination of money and the change in the way NBA teams evaluate talent” that forces 
players to turn professional as early as possible.104  In fact, from 2006 to 2011, only thirty-seven 
seniors were taken in the first round of the draft; in a draft that is comprised of thirty first-round 
selections, only thirty-seven seniors were taken out of a possible 150 selections.105   
Teams have moved away from selecting college seniors, and instead focus on upside and 
potential when it comes to evaluating younger draft prospects.  In fact, this shift in focus was 
actually the result of the those players who successfully skipped college to go straight for the 
NBA.106  The rationalization of organizations passing on more seasoned college players is that 
those players have already reached their potential, and the upside of younger players is simply 
far too great to pass on.107  The upshot of this shift in recruiting analysis is that every year a 
student-athlete plays in college, his draft value potentially decreases as that student-athlete loses 
the ability to claim professional upside or potential.108   
These shifts in scouting practices may also serve as a potential indication of the end of 
the NBA and NCAA being on the same side of pro-amateurism rules.  As a general matter, the 
NCAA governs the eligibility of all college athletes.109  “Because the NCAA is a non-profit with 
voluntary membership, its ability to impose rules and restrictions on student-athletes is virtually 
absolute.”110  Under the guise of protecting “amateurism,” the NCAA and its member 
universities have very clearly established rules by which all student-athletes who transition from 
college to professional sports must follow if they are to maintain their NCAA eligibility.111   
This means there exists a small set of student-athletes who will have to comply with two 
sets of rules—the NCAA’s and the NBA’s—while delaying their inevitable draft eligibility.112  
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Practically speaking, virtually any player who hopes to play in the NBA must comply with the 
NCAA’s rules at some point in their career, as the NBA’s rules now force the hands of high 
school players into attending at least one year of college.113  “Because of this one-year 
requirement, colleges and universities face an increasing number of student-athletes whose sole 
reason for attending school is to build their brand and pass the time before declaring for the NBA 
draft.”114  For those players that do hope to enter the NBA after their NCAA career, there are 
strict eligibility rules that must be adhered to in order to preserve their ability to play throughout 
that intermediary year.  However, the NCAA has taken certain steps to mitigate the potential 
disastrous consequences of a player breaking one of the NCAA’s eligibility rules—ineligibility.  
One way in which the NCAA has tried to mitigate the harshness of their rules is to allow a men’s 
basketball player to contact the NBA in order to determine his draft status via an “evaluation 
period.”115 
This evaluation period has the effect of allowing student-athletes to “declare for the NBA 
Draft, evaluate their prospects, and return to college with their eligibility intact, so long as they 
followed [the NCAA’s] rules.”116  “Between 2005 and 2010, 174 individuals returned to college 
after initially declaring their intention to enter the NBA draft.  It should be noted that over 20% 
of those returning players (36 out of 174, or 20.7%) were drafted in subsequent years.”117  
However, a student-athlete’s ability to evaluate their specific draft prospects may not actually 
mean much, given the common practices of draft scouts and NBA executives.  While student 
athletes may inquire about their draft status, their ability to declare for the draft while retaining 
their collegiate eligibility is an entirely different story.118  This is extremely important because 
NBA teams, given the timing of the NCAA tournament, the NBA Playoffs, the NBA 
Championship, and the impending free agency season, do not have the time to comprehensively 
evaluate a player in the allotted timeline.  Additionally, the NCAA prohibits student-athletes 
from signing with professional representation, who have the industry experience to help such 
student-athletes make educated, professional decisions.119  The general amateurism rules 
regarding agents apply to all student-athletes and clearly state that an athlete will permanently 
lose his eligibility should he agree, in any capacity, to be represented by a professional agent.120 
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No college basketball player highlighted the problems associated with these evaluation 
period rules more than Randolph Morris, in 2005, when he signed with an NBA team mid-season 
because of a loophole in the NCAA and NBA’s rules.  Morris, a high school All-American who 
nearly averaged a triple-double in his senior season, seriously considered entering the 2004 NBA 
Draft before committing to the University of Kentucky.121  After a lackluster freshman season at 
Kentucky, Randolph declared himself eligible for the 2005 NBA Draft, but he did so without 
signing an agent.122  After going undrafted, Morris returned for his sophomore season.  But 
because of a provision in the NBA’s CBA at the time, he was prohibited from re-entering the 
NBA Draft.123  As a result, Morris had free agent status all throughout that season.124  He 
eventually signed with the Knicks in 2007 for $1.6 million.125  This was extremely upsetting to 
the NCAA and clearly in violation of their goals of amateurism.  As a result, in 2009, the NCAA 
changed their rules with regard to declaring for the NBA Draft, and college players were now 
required to decide whether or not they would remain in the draft before the draft was held.126   
The NCAA’s tradition of “amateurism” is very closely aligned with the NBA’s age floor, 
but this tradition is more expansive and complex than its interaction with that rule.  These 
amateur rules have led to criticism and litigation across all levels of collegiate sports, which has 
garnered a great deal of national attention.127  When discussing the NCAA’s desire to preserve 
their tradition of amateurism, which underlies all their rules and policies, it is impossible to not 
discuss O’Bannon v. NCAA.128  This was an action brought by a group of former student-athletes 
challenging the NCAA’s rules restricting players from receiving any portion of the revenue the 
NCAA and its member universities earn from “the sale of licenses to use the student-athletes’ 
names, images, and likeness in videogames, live television telecasts, and other footage.”129   
In exchange for collegiate basketball players providing their schools with their athletic 
services and the use of their names, images, and likenesses for promotional purposes, these 
student-athletes receive a scholarship.130  Yet, the NCAA’s bylaws prohibit student-athletes from 
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receiving financial-aid based on the student’s athletic ability in excess of a full-ride – a full, 
grant-in-aid scholarship.131  The problem with these grant-in-aid scholarships is that they do not 
cover the full cost of attendance that these student-athletes encounter.132  This is where the 
inequity of the NCAA’s scholarship system typically begins to peer its head, because student-
athletes argue that collegiate programs make hundreds of millions of dollars annually, usually on 
the backs of their prominent sports programs, while student-athletes do not even receive enough 
aid to live comfortably.  This issue is further compounded when one takes into consideration 
draft age restrictions, which required these same student-athletes to play for an NCAA member 
institution because there is no other viable alternative.  
In the O’Bannon case, the NCAA’s main contention was that the amateur tradition of 
college sports contributed to its popularity and helped to promote consumer demand.133  The 
NCAA, in order to sustain its argument that student-athletes must not be paid, relied heavily on 
the United States Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents.134  Ultimately, the 
district court found that the dicta in this precedent was inapplicable to the case at hand, and ruled 
instead that the NCAA’s practice of limiting payments to student-athletes was a violation of 
antitrust laws.135  The court ordered that universities should be allowed to offer full cost-of-
attendance scholarships, which would expand the financial aid given to student-athletes.136 
 However, even with mechanisms like cost-of-attendance scholarships, such aid may still 
not be enough to actually provide a healthy lifestyle for student-athletes.  Ignoring the obvious 
argument that a cost-of-attendance scholarship is miniscule in light of what a player would make 
playing professionally, there are still instances in which collegiate players are unhappy with the 
state of the NCAA and their amateurism rules.  In 2014, in the immediate wake of the University 
of Connecticut men’s basketball team winning a national championship, this issue took over 
national news again when Shabazz Napier told reporters that he sometimes goes to bed starving 
because he cannot afford food.137  Napier, in what is a more conservative statement, said “[w]e 
as students get utilized for what we do so well, and we’re definitely blessed to get a scholarship 
to our universities, but at the end of the day, that doesn’t cover everything.  We do have hungry 
nights that we don’t have enough money to get food in.”138 
 Today, the inability of student-athletes to profit from their NIL may be changing, while 
also solving, in a single legislative act, the problems Napier complained of.  Currently, NCAA 
athletes are not allowed to accept money from any outside parties in exchange for the use of their 
NIL, per the amateurism policies and traditions of the NCAA.  States like Florida, California, 
and Colorado have each passed laws that will soon make it illegal for schools in those states to 
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follow the current NCAA NIL rules.139  In response to this state legislation, the NCAA put 
together a Congressional proposal that consists of a set of uniform rules that would apply to all 
member universities – this way, all states would have rules similar to Florida, California, and 
Colorado; functionally, this expansive proposal would enable all student-athletes to profit off 
their NIL.140  Even then, this move could be too little, too late; at least with regard to the top high 
school basketball prospects in the country.  The timing of this response is also rather interesting 
in that it comes in the immediate aftermath of top high school players opting for a six-figure 
salary in the G League over the NCAA and its amateurism.141  Given the timing of these 
responses, there is an argument to be made that the NCAA may be more motivated by the 
potential expansion of the NBA G League, and its ability to offer high school prospects a salary, 
than by cries for help by its student-athletes not being able to eat enough food. 
At its inception, the G League (at this point in its history, the NBA D League) was a 
small, eight-team regional league that functioned more as a last-ditch effort to make the NBA 
than a legitimate development mechanism for the NBA.142  Today, the NBA parades the G 
League as the “official minor league” of the NBA.143  G League players travel around the 
country playing a regular season schedule of fifty games, concluding in an annual playoff and 
championship.144  But the G League also serves some unique functions beyond “developing” 
NBA talent.  In its role as a “testing ground for new rules,” the NBA uses the G League as a 
testing ground for new rules each season.145  Even then, the goal of most G League players is still 
to make it to the NBA and have a successful NBA career.146  This is the primary goal for many 
of college basketball’s top players as well.  
Ultimately, the G League could serve as an alternative mechanism to fill the void 
between the NBA and NCAA, where the age eligibility rules could actually force top, inevitably 
NBA-bound high school players toward the G League rather than the NCAA.  “With the 
introduction of a true minor league system in the G League, a lower age rule would give NBA 
clubs control over players’ maturation processes before they enter the NBA, while 
simultaneously giving players hands-on training in the organization’s own development system 
and style.”147  Unfortunately, because this void has yet to be completely filled, there has been a 
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growing movement among the nation’s best high school players to seek other avenues besides 
the NCAA and their amateur rules.   
Most recently, there are LaMelo Ball and RJ Hampton, who both played professionally in 
Australia before their likely lottery selection in the 2020 NBA Draft.148  There have also been 
players who opted-out of their commitment to “blue chip” basketball programs to play in the G 
League and make significantly more money.  Jalen Green, the projected first pick in the 2021 
NBA Draft, is expected to receive a salary in the $500,000 range while in the G league in the 
2020 season.149  To make matters worse for the NCAA, a top-tier player like Isaiah Todd 
actually decommitted from the University of Michigan to sign a deal similar to Green.150  It is 
important to note, however, that finding alternative routes that circumvent playing in the NCAA 
is not a newfound concept among the country’s best high school players.  Brandon Jennings, in 
2008, was the country’s best high school point guard before he signed a three-year, $1.65 million 
contract to play in Italy. 151  This was the first time a player of his caliber opted for a non-NCAA 
route to the NBA.  Eventually, Jennings went on to be selected by the Milwaukee Bucks as a 
lottery selection in 2009, signaling that non-NCAA routes to the NBA do not necessarily 
decrease a prospect’s “draft stock.”  
 
IV. ELIGIBILITY RULES AND MINOR LEAGUE STRUCTURES IN THE MLB, 
NHL, AND THE PROFESSIONAL EUROPEAN MODEL 
 
 Professional baseball and the NCAA have a very different relationship than the NBA and 
the NCAA, due in large part to the draft eligibility rules of Major League Baseball (“MLB”).  
Generally, in order to be eligible for the MLB Draft, a player must be a resident of the United 
States or Canada and the player can never have signed a Major League or Minor League contract 
before.152  Additionally, high school players, if they have graduated from high school and have 
not yet attended college or junior college, college players from four-year colleges who have 
either completed their junior season or are at least twenty-one-years-old, and junior college 
players, regardless of how many years of school they have completed, are eligible for the MLB 
Draft.153  This means that players are forced to either commit to playing in college for at least 
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three years or opting to join the ranks of the extensive minor league system immediately after 
high school.   
 With regard to the MLB’s minor league structure, professional baseball has had the 
reputation for having the most extensive farm system of any professional sports league in 
America.154  Every MLB team is singly affiliated with minor league teams on at least six 
different levels of minor league play, including following levels: Rookie, Class A Short-Season, 
Class A, A, AA, AAA.155  Because every team has at least six minor league affiliates, each MLB 
team is paying the salary of hundreds of players – many of whom will never see the professional 
field.156  Professional baseball, however, also has a very strong players’ union that “has 
continually and systematically exploited minor leaguers.”157  Minor league players have no 
access to the open labor market, where the primary market restraints “can be classified as player 
mobility restrictions.”158  Unlike the NBA though, the MLB continues to enjoy the last remaining 
traces of their exemption from antitrust laws that the federal courts granted to baseball before the 
Curt Flood Act of 1998.159   
The Curt Flood Act, however, does not apply to minor league players and, as a result, does 
not protect their contracts.160  Additionally, minor league players receive none of the benefits of 
the MLBPA, which leaves their rights in the hands of unsupervised, unchecked MLB 
organizational owners.161  As an example, the lack of minor league protection was on full display 
in 2018, when the MLB lobbied the federal government to further restrict minor league wages 
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more than they already were.162  Even Gene Orza, a twenty-six-year labor attorney for the 
MLBPA, emphasized that “the Players Association doesn’t represent the minor league players, 
and therefore, ha[s] no obligation to help them out.”163  Because of this, minor league players are 
easily exploitable, lack any formal means of protection, and have a low standard of living in the 
wake of their low salary and short season.164 
The National Hockey League (“NHL”), on the other hand, has the most lenient, player-
friendly draft eligibility rules of any major professional sports organization in the United States.  
There is no established age floor in the NHL, unlike its NBA counterpart. 165  Instead, any player 
who will be eighteen by September 15th of that calendar year through any player who will still 
be twenty at the end of said calendar year is available to be selected in the NHL Draft; to make 
matters more inclusive, any player who is twenty-one or twenty-two and had previously been 
drafted, but did not sign with the team that drafted them is again eligible for that year’s draft.166  
The pool of eligible players includes any domestic or international players, players who have 
been passed over in previous drafts, those who chose not to sign with the team that previously 
drafted them, and players participating in junior-level, high school, college, or professional 
hockey overseas.167  For those not drafted, there is also a period of time in which they have the 
opportunity to sign with an NHL team as an undrafted free agent as opposed to waiting and re-
entering a subsequent draft.168 
Even after being selected, the NHL’s system for managing the contract status of drafted 
players is still incredibly flexible and friendly to both teams and players, in that the negotiation 
process has more room for truly determining an adequate salary in light of the players’ skill.169  
An NHL team has nearly a year, until the following June 1st after the draft, to retain the 
exclusive negotiating rights with a domestic draft pick.170  While the NHL has built in certain 
signing procedures that allow drafted players, and their respective teams, to mitigate the risks of 
certain players not being ready for the NHL immediately, these same procedures cannot apply to 
those players who are committed to playing in the NCAA in light of the NCAA’s amateurism 
rules.171  Because of this, the NHL and NCAA found a “loophole” to the NCAA’s rules.  Any 
drafted player, who is, or becomes, a college student by June 1st following his initial draft 
selection does not need to agree to a contract with the NHL team that drafted him in order to 
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with that player throughout their five years of NCAA eligibility, or until August 15th following 
his graduation.172 
Unlike the inequitable and non-unionized minor league system of the MLB, professional 
hockey and the NHL is home to the most established unionized minor league in any major 
professional sport.173  In 1967, NHL players made a second attempt at forming a players’ 
association after the players’ first efforts were met with less than successful results.174  Since 
1967, the National Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”) has thrived and gone on to 
represent professional hockey players with much success.175   
 Structurally, the NHL has two premier minor leagues: the American Hockey League 
(“AHL”) and the East Coast Hockey League (“ECHL”).176  The AHL, often likened to the 
MLB’s triple-A minor league, is the top minor league of the NHL; the league itself has a “30-for-
30” model, where each AHL team has an NHL affiliate.177  The AHL’s minimum salary was 
$51,000 in 2020-21, and the average salary was over $90,000 in 2015.178  In addition to this 
salary, AHL players receive quality benefits, including a per diem allowance on the road, travel 
expenses, health insurance coverage, and arbitration for dispute resolution.179  While these 
figures are still low compared to the NHL’s minimum player salary, they are much higher than 
what the average minor league baseball or G League player would make.180  As minor league 
hockey does not generate the large attendance or TV revenues of other minor leagues, the 
difference in salary is most likely the result of collective bargaining at the major league level.181 
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 On a completely different side of the professional league spectrum, professional 
basketball in Europe presents a completely different structure than any professional organization 
in the U.S.  European teams often have varying sets of rules and eligibility requirements.  For 
example, some European leagues place certain restrictions on the number of foreign players they 
allow on their roster.182  On the other hand, some leagues outside of Europe have a similar 
structure to the NBA, where there is a set number of teams and they compete to win an annual 
championship.183  Other European basketball leagues tend to take a tiered approach, in which 
teams compete in certain leagues only after they have met certain performance expectations in 
smaller national leagues.184  For example, teams’ qualifications for the EuroLeague (the premier 
basketball league in Europe) is based on their success in their domestic leagues and other 
competitions around Europe.185 
European basketball allows teams to sign players as teens, develop them, and bring them up 
in that specific league.186  Take Luka Doncic as a case study of European basketball 
development.  At just sixteen-years-old, Doncic had become the youngest player to step on the 
floor with Real Madrid, Spain’s premier professional team.187  Doncic came to the club at the age 
of thirteen, when he uprooted his life in Slovenia to live with the organization and train with their 
professional staff.188  At thirteen, Doncic had signed a deal with Real Madrid that lasted through 
2022; that deal, however, was always looking towards his future in the NBA with multiple NBA 
escape clauses.189  Since then, he was drafted as the third overall pick in the 2018 NBA Draft, 
and in his second season in the NBA averaged nearly 29 points per game.190   
While it is easy to attribute Doncic’s success to anything other than the European 
development model, European players are clearly taking the NBA by storm.191  Today, 108 
international players from thirty-eight countries were on “opening-night rosters for the 2019-20 
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season.”192  Among those players, four won 2018-19 Kia NBA Performance Awards: Giannis 
Antetokounmpo won the NBA Most Valuable Player, Doncic won Rookie of the Year, Pascal 
Siakam won NBA Most Improved Player, and Rudy Gobert won NBA Defensive Player of the 
Year.193  It is easy to see then that European player success in the NBA is in large part due to the 
structure and development of European players.  These players’ professional, structured 
development began at a younger age while overseas compared to their American counterparts, 





While the present infrastructure of the NBA Draft make it unlikely, if not completely 
impossible to adopt a model similar to those seen in Europe, the NBA and its G League could 
very easily adopt eligibility rules and a draft structure similar to that of the NHL with great 
success.  Even with the European model’s success, it would be too difficult to completely 
reshape the way professional basketball is formatted.  The MLB model, on the other hand, has 
proven to be incredibly problematic in its treatment of minor league players, and given its sheer 
size, the NBA and the G League would likely opt for a more financially viable minor league 
structure.  
The NHL, on the other hand, has had prospered with their sports entry model, even without 
the viewership and endorsement deals of the NBA and its affiliates.  The NBA could more easily 
adopt the structure of the NHL’s eligibility requirements and the flexibility that comes with those 
rules.  In applying this format to current and future players, the NBA would be ensuring NBA 
organizations actually get NBA-ready talent when they want, as opposed to forcing teams to 
abide by a blanket prohibition on players under the age of nineteen.  It may be easy and more 
financially viable for the NBA to simply allow a player to develop elsewhere for a year before 
entering the NBA—saving the NBA millions in development costs and allowing organizations to 
avoid any unnecessary risk.  However, given the growing fanbase of the G League and the newer 
NIL rules that are sprouting up around the country, now, more than ever, the NBA is primed to 
take a step in the right direction towards implanting a true minor league.   
The NHL Draft model would simply be the mechanism by which high school basketball 
players would have the best chance to truly assess their professional outlooks without losing 
NCAA eligibility.  This model would allow players to either: (1) enter the NBA Draft 
immediately, and play in the G League to develop their talent in a system more akin to that of an 
actual minor league; (2) enter the NBA Draft immediately and then opt to play in the NCAA as 
their means of development, and in doing so student-athletes could potentially increase their 
marketability and brand with the new NIL rules at the collegiate level; (3) a player could not be 
drafted and sign with an NBA franchise, in which case the NBA organization can opt to send that 
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player to the G League on a two-way contract; or (4) the high school player could simply choose 
to play in the NCAA, not because he has to, but because he wants to.  In so doing, that player can 
still earn money and opt to enter the NBA Draft later on when they are more developed.  This 
structure would give players more routes to enter the NBA while also potentially increasing the 
talent pool in a given draft because players were allowed to select their means of development as 
opposed to being forced into a “one-size-fits-all” developmental scheme.   
These different routes may be in direct conflict with the interests of the NCAA, given their 
reliance on the one-and-done rule for an influx of talent.  However, it may also provide college 
basketball fans something they haven’t had since the early 2000s: players who want to be in 
college.  The NCAA with its new NIL rules may actually attract players who are genuinely 
interested in contributing to a collegiate team and developing their brand along the way.  The 
NCAA would avoid players like Ben Simmons, who clearly went to college to meet the age floor 
of the NBA and stopped attending class the moment his NCAA Tournament chances 
disappeared.194  This would mean fans of college basketball can enjoy basketball in its purest 
form rather than renting top high school players for a year before they entered the NBA.   
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